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EXPORTING UNAPPROVED NEW DRUGS:
SAVING AMERICAN JOBS OR
IMPERILING FOREIGN
CONSUMERS?
The last day of the 99th Congress saw a momentous piece of health legis-
lation enacted. Called the "Omnibus Health Act" ("OHA"),1 it is an amal-
gam of health and health-related measures, key among them being the Drug
Export Amendments Act of 1986 ("Drug Export Act" or "Act").2 Passage
of the Drug Export Act alters radically the long-standing American regula-
tory practice forbidding the export of "new drugs"3 not approved for use in
the United States by the federal Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").4
Although critics of the ban claimed that it resulted only from an inadvertent
drafting error during passage of 1938 amendments to the federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"),5 others viewed the policy, whatever its
origin, "as an important deterrent to the dumping of unsafe drugs in devel-
oping countries."
Irrespective of the ban's origin or purpose, Congress' decision to modify it
and allow United States manufacturers to ship unapproved new drugs to
1. Pub. L. No. 99-660, tit. I, Drug Export Amendment Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3743 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
This article focuses almost solely on the debate that took place during the 99th session of
Congress on the subject of drug export and the legislative changes that resulted. For an in-
depth discussion on the history and origin of the ban on drug exports and earlier proposals to
amend it, see Comment, Export of Pharmaceutical Products Under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 13 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 125 (1980).
2. The Drug Export Act was part of a last minute legislative compromise. Drug export
legislation was never formally considered by the House of Representatives or by a House-
Senate Conference Committee in the 99th Congress. The Senate was the only chamber to
formally approve a measure authorizing the export of unapproved new drugs during the 99th
Congress. See 132 CONG. REC. HII, 591-92 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986, pt. II) (explanation of the
recent legislative history of drug export bill by Rep. Waxman).
3. The term "new drug" applies to a category of drugs created by the reenactment of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") in 1938, and generally refers to drugs not
on the market at the time that are not generally recognized as safe and effective by scientific
experts. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(a)(2)(p) (1982).
4. Drugs not deemed "new", Le., those that were on the market prior to the 1938 reen-
actment of the FDCA, are exempt from the export restrictions. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(a)(2)(p)(l),
381(d) (1982); see infra note 23 and accompanying text.
5. Eg., S. REP. No. 225, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6298, 6301 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
6. See Sun, New Momentum for Drug Export Bill, 230 Sci. 926 (1985).
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countries designated in the legislation represents a fundamental change in
American public policy. However, although the pharmaceutical industry
played a key role in securing enactment of the Drug Export Act, the major
impetus for this policy reversal was the mood of trade protectionism present
in the 99th Congress.7 In this case, Congress's protectionist fervor was pi-
qued by the fledgling biotechnology industry. Specifically, the industry con-
tended that the export ban forced it to transfer vital technology to overseas
partners, thus precipitating the loss of American jobs and injuring the na-
tion's competitive advantage in biotechnology.'
This comment will examine key portions of the Drug Export Act and the
arguments for and against the policy changes they represent. Special atten-
tion will be focused on the issue of transshipment or re-export (terms used
interchangeably throughout this comment) and whether the Act contains
safeguards sufficient to prevent unapproved new drugs from being shipped to
Third World countries. 9
THE DRUG EXPORT ACT - AN OVERVIEW
This portion of the comment will discuss the conflicting ways in which
members of Congress viewed the drug export legislation and will examine
some specific provisions in the Act, contrasting them, when useful, with
some other recent proposals. The purpose of this section is to present a
cogent picture of the Drug Export Act as a prelude to a discussion of its
ethical implications.
The Drug Export Act was the subject of extensive deliberations in the
Senate. In the House, the legislation received far less public scrutiny and
was never formally approved by either the committee with jurisdiction over
it or the full House, until it came to the floor for a vote as part of the OHA.'°
Not only did the progress of the legislation differ between the two chambers,
but the way in which each chamber viewed the legislation was also quite
different.
In the Senate, drug export legislation was viewed and promoted largely on
the basis of the salutary effect it would have on the economy and the current
trade imbalance. This view is expressed in Senator Orrin Hatch's" descrip-
7. Id.
8. Drug Export, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 112-16 (1985)(statement of Robert Swanson, Chief Exec. Officer,
Genentech)[hereinafter Hearing].
9. See, e.g., Behr, Shaping Drug-Export Legislation: Broader Political Themes Drama-
tized in Struggle, Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 1985, at KI, col. 1.
10. See supra note 2.
11. In the 99th Congress, Senator Orrin Hatch was Chairman of the Senate Labor and
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tion of the bill1 2 to his Senate colleagues:
This legislation will save American jobs, prevent the export of
American biotechnology, and decrease our balance-of-payments
deficit, without increasing the health risk to foreign consumers,
without erecting trade barriers that invite retaliation and without
costing the taxpayer money.'
3
In the House, however, drug export legislation was viewed more skepti-
cally. In stark contrast to Hatch's remarks, Representative Henry Wax-
man 4 described the drug export legislation he sponsored' 5 as something of a
damage control measure, to rein in, if necessary, the sweeping reforms under
consideration in the Senate. 6 Waxman indicated that the purpose of the
legislation he introduced was to assure that any unapproved drugs sold
abroad were labeled accurately and did not omit necessary health warnings
or contain unfounded health claims.1 7 Further, Waxman conceded that he
was "troubled by the proposition that unapproved drugs should be exported
from the U.S. under any circumstances."' 18
Thus, the leadership of the two chambers of Congress approached the
drug export legislation from seemingly irreconcilably different perspectives;
while the Senate leadership actively championed drug export reform as a
desirable trade and economic measure, the House leadership expressed deep
reservations about the need for reform. If forced to compromise, however,
the House intended to assure that such legislation contained safeguards to
protect foreign consumers from what it believed were foreseeable harms. 19
Human Resources Committee. This Committee has primary jurisdiction over the FDCA.
CONGRESSIONAL YELLOW BOOK, 1-45, 111-36 (Fall 1986).
12. S. 1848, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S5655 (daily ed. May 8, 1986).
13. 132 CONG. REC. S5657 (daily ed. May 8, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch) [hereinafter
Senate Debate]; see Hatch, Areas for Change in the Food and Drug Laws, 38 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 97, 100-01 (1983).
14. In the 99th Congress, Representative Henry Waxman was Chairman of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce's Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. This
subcommittee has primary jurisdiction over the FDCA. CONGRESSIONAL YELLOW BOOK II-
253, IV-29 (Fall 1986).
15. H.R. 3962, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
16. See 132 CONG. REC. E5688 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1985) (statement by Rep. Waxman).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Given the concerns expressed by Representative Waxman, it may seem somewhat
anomalous that he eventually agreed to support enactment of drug export legislation at all.
Waxman's acquiescence can, however, be explained as a political compromise or deal; he
agreed to accept drug export legislation in exchange for Senator Hatch's agreement to include
the vaccine injury compensation measure he was promoting in the Omnibus Health Package.
See F-D-C Reports, Oct. 27, 1986, at 3.
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Not surprisingly, the Drug Export Act reflects both the enthusiasm of the
Senate and, albeit to a lesser extent, the reluctance of the House.
The provisions of the Drug Export Act that are examined here include:
(a) countries to which unapproved drugs can be shipped, (b) export applica-
tion requirements, (c) assurances that FDA approval will be actively pur-
sued for any drug exported, and (d) the safeguards intended to prevent any
re-export of unapproved new drugs. These provisions are of particular inter-
est because they establish a framework for the legislation and were among
the topics most vigorously debated by the Congress as it considered the
legislation.
Approved Countries
The Drug Export Act lists twenty-one countries,20 most of them Euro-
pean, to which American manufacturers may export drugs not approved by
the FDA. Such drugs must, however, be approved for use in the country to
which they are being shipped by that country's drug regulatory authority.2'
The ostensible basis on which these twenty-one countries were chosen for
inclusion in the bill was that they had a regulatory apparatus that was suffi-
ciently sophisticated to protect the health of their consumers.22 Under cur-
rent law, new drugs not approved for use in the United States cannot be
exported, even if the country of destination has approved the same drug for
its own use.23
This somewhat simplistic approach to determining which countries are
exempt from the ban on unapproved new drug exports (simply listing the
approved countries) was derived from the bill sponsored by Waxman. By
contrast, the Senate legislation proposed a tiered system; the Congress would
designate certain countries that were exempt automatically from the ban but
would allow other countries to be added to this list at the behest of the Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Human Services ("Secretary"), under
20. The approved countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal.
Drug Export Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 102, 100 Stat. at 3746 (to be codified at 21
U.S.C. § 381).
21. Id. at § 102, 100 Stat. at 3744 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 3606).
22. E.g., 132 CONG. REC. S17,345 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
23. Drugs that are not "new drugs" can be exported if they adhere to the specifications of
the foreign purchaser, are not in conflict with the laws of the country to which they are in-
tended for export, are labeled on the outside of the shipping package that they are intended for
export, and are not sold or offered for sale in domestic commerce. 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1)
(1982).
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certain guidelines.24 This so-called tiered approach was criticized widely on
the basis that the Secretary would find it difficult, if not impossible, to resist
demands from United States allies that they be added to the list of approved
countries, irrespective of whether they met the guidelines prescribed." Ulti-
mately, the chambers compromised by adopting the House approach but
expanded the list of approved countries by nearly threefold.26 Further, the
power to add countries to the approved list was retained by the Congress.27
Export Application Requirements
Although unapproved new drugs may be shipped to the countries desig-
nated in the Act, would-be exporters must make application to the Secretary
ninety days prior to shipping. 28 An application must identify the drug to be
shipped, list the country of destination and person to whom it is to be
shipped, and make specific "certifications. '' 29 The required certifications in-
clude assurances that: (a) unapproved drugs will be exported only to ap-
proved countries, (b) only reasonable quantities of the drug will be exported,
(c) FDA approval of the drug will be pursued actively, (d) the drug's ex-
porter and importer have signed a written agreement not to re-export the
drug to an unapproved country, and (e) the importer has agreed to notify the
exporter of any unauthorized re-export.3° The Secretary must review the
application and approve it conditionally if it contains the requisite informa-
tion and certifications, other than verification that the drug has been ap-
proved in the country of destination; the application is to receive automatic
approval within five days of the submission of this verification."a In addition
to these provisions, ten days following the Secretary's receipt of an export
24. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31-34. The guidelines in the Senate bill, which were
incorporated into the Drug Export Act, specify that to be added to the list of approved coun-
tries a country must have: (a) a government entity to review the safety and effectiveness of a
drug, (b) methods and facilities used in the manufacturing, processing and packing of drugs
that are adequate to preserve strength, identity, quality and purity, (c) adequate procedures to
report adverse drug reactions and remove unsafe drugs from the market, and (d) labeling and
promotion practices which accord with the indications for which the drug is approved. Pub.
L. No. 99-660, § 102, 100 Stat. at 3746-47 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 381).
25. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 66-67.
26. H.R. 3962, supra note 15, at § 802(c) (only 7 countries were listed in the bill).
27. The authority for the Secretary to add countries to the list of those approved that
appeared in the Senate bill was not included in the Drug Export Act as enacted, thus by
implication reserving that power to the Congress. Compare S.1848, supra note 12, at § 801
with Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 102, 100 Stat. at 3747 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 381).
28. Id. at § 102, 100 Stat. at 3745 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 381).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at § 102, 100 Stat. at 3745-46 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 381).
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application a notice must be placed in the Federal Register.32
Prior to the addition of the notice requirement, there was some criticism
that the legislation lacked any provision for public notification of a sponsor's
intent to export unapproved new drugs. 3 Consequently, the provision for
publication in the Federal Register of intent-to-ship notices was designed
specifically to meet those concerns.
Another point of criticism that was not addressed in the Act was the pro-
vision for virtual automatic approval of an application if an exporter pro-
vides the required information and certifications. Critics charged that such
automatic approval relegates the FDA to a purely ministerial role, as it is
only effectively authorized to insure that certain technical requirements are
met, and is inconsistent with the FDA's policy in other areas.a4 The FDA's
view on this matter is consistent, however, with the provisions in the Act.
During Senate hearings on export legislation, the FDA indicated that it
should not be obligated to affirmatively approve an application for export
because of its inability to judge the reasonableness of marketing a drug in
another country.35
FDA Approval
To gain approval for an application to ship an unapproved new drug, an
applicant must have an investigational new drug application ("IND") on file
with the FDA36 and must certify that it is actively pursuing FDA ap-
proval.37 Both of these requirements were somewhat controversial through-
out the debate on this legislation.38 The underlying concern was that some
provision was needed to insure that drugs that had been withdrawn from
approval, or could not be approved in the United States because of problems
with their safety and/or efficacy, would not be eligible for export.39
32. Id. at § 102, 100 Stat. at 3745 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 381).
33. Hearing, supra note 8, at 211.
34. Id. By "other policies" Dr. Wolfe was referring to the FDA regulations on the export
of drugs for investigational use that require the FDA take affirmative steps to approve an
export request. New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product Regulations; Export Provi-
sions, 49 Fed. Reg. 2095, 2096 (1984) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.110).
35. Hearing, supra note 8, at 61.
36. In order to obtain the "substantial evidence" necessary for FDA approval of a drug,
well controlled investigations by experts are required. Advance approval for such investiga-
tions is required and can be obtained by filing an acceptable "Notice of Claimed Investiga-
tional Exemption for a New Drug," commonly referred to as an "IND". 21 C.F.R. § 312.1
(1986).
37. Drug Export Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 102, 100 Stat. 3744 (to
be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355).
38. Hearing, supra note 8, at 41 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
39. Id. at 209-10.
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Thus, to insure that approval is being sought actively for exported unap-
proved new drugs, the Act provides that an applicant must report to the
Secretary annually on the actions taken in pursuit of FDA approval.4 If
this report is found wanting, the applicant has sixty days to take whatever
steps are necessary to demonstrate compliance and is given the opportunity
for an informal hearing.41
Requiring only that a manufacturer file an IND and be able to demon-
strate active pursuit of FDA approval may seem to provide scant assurance
that a drug is safe and effective. Yet, these requirements appear to offer a
measure of protection for foreign consumers commensurate with the re-
quirement embodied in the House legislation that a new drug application
("NDA")"2 be on file with the FDA.43 Specifically, submission of an NDA
would signify that the drug is beyond the IND stage in the approval process,
and thus, would seem to provide greater assurance that the drug is not
harmful. The FDA complained that requiring that an NDA be on file would
only "encourage the filing of frivolous, incomplete and premature [NDA's]
and [would] not assure the safety and effectiveness of an exported new
drug."' Thus, in light of the FDA's lack of confidence in the NDA require-
ment, it appears that the Act's mandate that an applicant file an IND and
provide the agency with assurances that it is actively pursuing approval, of-
fers virtually as much assurance of a drug's safety and effectiveness as would
a formal NDA filing.4
Transshipment
Indisputably, the issue most vigorously contested as the Congress debated
40. Drug Export Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 102, 100 Stat. 3747 (to
be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 381). See F-D-C Reports, Jan. 19, 1987 at 8 (FDA Compliance
Office Director Daniel Michels is reported to have complained that IND sponsors are not now
particularly prompt or forthcoming in their annual reports: a problem he described as "troub-
lesome at its face and even more troublesome" in the context of the requirements of the Drug
Export Act).
41. Drug Export Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, at § 102, 100 Stat. 3748
(to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 381).
42. A drug may not be sold commercially in the U.S. until it is approved by the FDA.
Such approval is contingent on the filing of a new drug application ("NDA") containing ac-
ceptable scientific data related to its safety and efficacy. See 21 C.F.R. § 314 (1986) (listing the
FDA's NDA requirements in exhaustive detail).
43. See H.R. 3962, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 802(c)(1) (1985).
44. Letter from FDA Comm'r Frank E. Young to Rep. Edward Madigan (May 9, 1986)
(answering a series of questions on the proposed drug export legislation) [hereinafter FDA
Letter]. The FDA is, however, reportedly considering adoption of a formal plan to monitor
the submission of reports under an IND to verify that sponsors are actively pursuing FDA
approval of an exported new drug. F-D-C Reports, Jan. 19, 1987 at 8.
45. FDA Letter, supra note 44.
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the drug export legislation was transshipment of unapproved drugs from
countries on the approved list to Third World countries.46 Senator Edward
Kennedy,47 a leading figure in the debate stated that he would not support
any legislation that did not contain safeguards to "minimize the risk that
[United States] unapproved drugs... could be diverted.",4 ' The Drug Ex-
port Act contains a number of safeguards intended to prevent unapproved
new drugs from being exported and/or re-exported to unapproved countries.
As noted earlier, a drug's exporter must certify to the Secretary that the
importer has agreed not to transship and to report any unauthorized trans-
shipment. 49 The bill also provides authority for the Secretary to seize drugs,
seek an injunction against the exporter, and impose criminal penalties if a
drug is shipped in violation of any provision of the Drug Export Act.5 ° Fur-
ther, if an importer ships drugs to an unauthorized country in violation of
these restrictions, the Secretary can prohibit further shipments to that im-
porter, unless the importer's action is deemed unintentional. 5 Finally, the
Secretary can prohibit immediately the shipping of a drug, even to a country
authorized to receive it, if it poses an imminent hazard to that country.
52
Although the concerns that made this issue central in the debate will be
examined in more detail, the major criticism of the proposed safeguards
against transshipment was that the FDA had no authority to actively police
compliance. 3 FDA officials, however, testified that such authority was un-
necessary because once a drug left the United States it had no ability to
police compliance.54 Thus, it is at least arguable that legislative prohibitions
against transshipment, no matter how restrictive, would be inadequate to
prevent unapproved drugs from being re-exported to Third World countries.
Although opponents of the bill argued against its enactment on this basis, 55
46. Behr, supra note 9.
47. In the 99th Congress, Senator Kennedy served as the ranking minority member of the
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. CONGRESSIONAL YELLOW BOOK 1-57, III-
36 (Fall 1986).
48. Behr, supra note 9.
49. Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 102, 100 Stat. 3745 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 381).
50. Id. at § 103, 100 Stat. 3751 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. 333). The Export Act relies on
provisions contained in the FDCA for authority to obtain an injunction and impose criminal
penalties for violations. The pertinent authority related to injuctions is embodied in Section
302 of the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1982). The applicable criminal penalties are found in
the FDCA at Section 303(a)-(b) and constitute a maximum fine of $1,000 and prison term of
not more than one year. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)-(b) (1982).
51. Pub. L. No. 99-660 § 102, 100 Stat. 3751 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 381).
52. Id.; see also infra note 129 (discussion of imminent hazard authority).
53. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 65.
54. Hearing, supra note 8, at 54 (statement of Thomas Scarlett, General Counsel, FDA).
55. "Transshipping bans for unapproved drugs would be as futile as they have already
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they ultimately failed to convince Congress to reject the legislation because
of the potential problems in controlling transshipment.
DRUG EXPORT - THE ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE
The struggle over enactment of the Drug Export Act pitted the American
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries against public opinion and
consumer groups throughout the world.56 Both sides made compelling argu-
ments for and against the legislation. The industry argued that the ban on
exporting unapproved new drugs created an unfair advantage for foreign
pharmaceutical companies, and was paternalistic and unnecessary. 57 Con-
versely, opponents argued that the legislation, not the ban, was unnecessary,
and worse, would serve to codify an immoral double standard.5" This sec-
tion of the comment will examine the arguments of both the legislation's
supporters and detractors in an effort to establish the merits of and risks
posed by the Drug Export Act.
Drug Export's Proponents - Economic Benefits and Jobs
The major arguments advanced by the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries in favor of lifting the export ban were that it worked an unfair
hardship on these industries, resulted in the loss of American jobs and the
transfer of American technology, and was based on misguided paternal-
ism.59 Testifying before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Commit-
tee, Michael B. Smith, Acting U.S. Trade Representative, reinforced the
industry's concerns.' Specifically, Smith described the effect of the ban as
detrimental to United States companies desiring to compete for international
business because it forced them to export capital, technology, and jobs at a
time of increasing foreign competition and unprecedented trade deficits. 6I
The concerns expressed by the Acting Trade Representative and the in-
dustry were based on supportable evidence. In 1985 the United States De-
partment of Commerce reported that United States drug imports rose thirty-
five percent, representing a trend that could lead to a negative balance of
proven to be for our current nuclear-and computer-related exports." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 123 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
56. See Hearing, supra note 8, at 222-40 (listing groups opposed to the legislation, re-
printing newspaper editorials in opposition to the legislation and letters from international
consumer groups opposed to the legislation).
57. Id. at 68-80 (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, PMA).
58. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 56 (views of Sen. Metzenbaum).
59. Id. at 5-6.
60. Id.
61. Hearing, supra note 8, at 340.
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trade in pharmaceuticals by the year 1986.62 This statistic was of particular
relevance because the drug industry, in contrast to many other sectors of the
United States economy, had shown consistently a hefty trade surplus. 63 In
addition, a number of pharmaceutical companies proffered evidence that the
export ban was directly responsible for their decisions to locate or expand
facilities abroad64-decisions that typically resulted in the permanent loss of
jobs for Americans.65
The advantages to be gained by removing the export restrictions were ex-
tremely attractive to legislators concerned about the state of the United
States economy. Specifically, a study conducted by American Cyanamid's
Lederle Laboratories projected that lifting the ban would boost the number
of jobs in the United States by some 2,482 to 40,000 over five years.66 Simi-
larly, industry estimates were that $400 to $500 million in additional exports
would be generated by the abolition of the ban.6 7
It was the emerging biotechnology industry, however, that made the most
lasting impression on the Congress with respect to its arguments on trade
and economic policy. Reliable estimates are that future markets for biotech-
nology could yield $15 to $100 billion worth of products sold by the year
2000.6' Although the United States is currently acknowledged as the world
leader in biotechnology, foreign governments have become actively involved
in efforts to enhance the development of commercial biotechnology in their
countries-a development which analysts fear could have "an undesirable
long-term impact on the competitiveness of the United States biotechnology
industry. ' '69 Thus, when Genentech, a leading biotechnology firm, testified
that the impact of the export ban was to drain technology, capital and jobs
from the United States70 in this new field of growth, the response from the
62. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1984 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 17-2 (1985); but see U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1986 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK: PROSPECTS FOR OVER 350 INDUSTRIES
17-1 (1986)(noting that many trade policies of foreign governments have actually slowed U.S.
pharmaceutical expansion abroad)[hereinafter 1986 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK].
63. Hearing, supra note 8, at 342 (statement of Ambassador Smith, Acting U.S. Trade
Representative).
64. Id. at 106-07 (statement of David D. Sharrock, President, Merell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals U.S.A.).
65. Id. at 308-09 (statement submitted by Merck & Co.).
66. Id. at 5 (statement of Senator Hatch); see 1986 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK, supra note 61
at 17-1 (estimating that 4,000 jobs a year could be created by lifting the ban).
67. Hearing, supra note 8, at 343.
68. 2 OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, REPORT OF A WORKING GROUP
ON COMPETITIVE AND TRANSFER' ASPECTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY app. at 5-6 (1983).
69. Id. at 103.
70. See Hearing, supra note 8, at 112; see also Export of Unapproved New Drugs: Hearings
on H.R. 3962 and H.R. 3992 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-46 (1986).
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Congress was one of genuine concern. 71 In fact, two long time and influen-
tial opponents of drug export legislation recanted their blanket opposition to
it based on the potential impact on the biotechnology industry.72
Certain features unique to the biotechnology industry made the export
ban particularly problematic. Although the biotechnology industry is not a
dominant force in the pharmaceutical arena, in 1985 there were over 200
biotechnology companies, 62 percent of which were applying their technol-
ogy to the pharmaceutical area.73 It is the smaller biotechnology companies,
however, that are considered particularly important in the pharmaceutical
industry because of the high proportion of innovation attributable to them.74
These companies were, however, the most disadvantaged internationally by
the export ban, as compared to the larger, more well-established pharmaceu-
tical companies, because the United States drug approval process is so com-
plex and time consuming, 75 and because they did not have the option of
manufacturing products overseas at facilities maintained by subsidiaries.
Thus, if these smaller companies were to supply foreign markets, where
their products had been approved for use, they were forced to license their
technology overseas. 6  Such licensing arrangements, however, result most
often and most directly in the transfer of valuable technology, and thus dam-
age further the United States' international balance of trade.77 Consequently,
the biotechnology companies located in the United States were extremely
anxious to have the export ban lifted in order to protect and enhance their
competitive lead and to enable them to build and/or retain production facili-
ties in this country.
Another frequently heard charge from the supporters of the drug export
legislation was that the FDA's policy was paternalistic.78  As a basis for
71. Hearing, supra note 8, at 123 (the biotechnology industry estimated that the number
of jobs at risk in their industry is between 10,000 and 20,000 over five years).
72. Id. at 347-52 (reprint of a letter from Philip R. Lee and Milton Silverman to Sen.
Orrin Hatch).
73. Id. at 347 (statement of Robert Swanson, Chief Exec. Officer, Genentech, Inc.).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 130-41 (statement of Tim Hart, Exec. Dir., Ass'n of Biotechnology Co.).
76. Id. at 309-12; See, Fox & Allard, Exporting United States Pharmaceuticals in the
1980's, 30 FED. B. NEWS & J. 496 (1983); See also Scotland Lures Biotech Plant, 137 CHEM.
WEEK 12 (1985) (describing how one company actually elected to locate its facilities abroad in
order to elude the FDA ban).
77. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 6-7 (1984); Prokesch, Stop-
ping the High-Tech Giveaway, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1987, § 3 at 1, col. 2 (warning that if
American companies do not change their approach to cooperative ventures the resulting trans-
fer of technology to foreign countries could ultimately threaten the nation's dominance of
other key industries, including biotechnology).
78. See generally, Fox & Allard, supra note 75.
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regulation, paternalism is one that demands constant reexamination,79 and
supporters of the drug export legislation claimed that upon reexamination it
seemed "inappropriate ... for a supplier of medicines to many nations to
hold up any one country's medical judgment as universal authority.""0 Even
Senator Edward Kennedy described the ban as "arrogance" which
threatened to deny needed drugs to those in countries in which they had
been approved.8' The FDA took the position that each sovereign govern-
ment has the primary responsibility for determining the types of drugs that
can be imported from abroad and that the agency's judgment about a drug
should not be controlling.8 2 Other commentators noted that the FDA's de-
cisions may not be applicable to foreign countries because decisions related
to a drug's risk-benefit ratio can vary significantly between countries.8 3
Drug Export's Opponents - Morals and Health
Opponents of the drug export legislation were not persuaded by the indus-
try's arguments and charged that the legislation created an immoral double
standard, did not promote public health and would besmirch, or even ruin
the United States' reputation for high quality pharmaceuticals.8 4 Moreover,
opponents disputed claims by the pharmaceutical industry that lifting the
ban would create a plethora of new jobs or was needed for the industry to
remain competitive.8 5 Finally, in response to the charge of paternalism, op-
ponents cited strong evidence that the United States' system for drug ap-
proval is, in fact, superior to that of other countries, and thus it is not
paternalistic for the United States to refuse to export drugs to the rest of the
world that have not been proven to be safe and effective for use in this
country.8 6
One of the most repeated criticisms of the drug export legislation was that
it represented an invidious double standard by protecting American consum-
ers from potentially unsafe drugs while leaving the rest of the world to fend
for itself.87 In testimony before the Senate, Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., Director
79. See Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1104
(1983).
80. Hearing, supra note 8, at 312.
81. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at S5661 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
82. Hearing, supra note 8, at 51-57.
83. Comment, supra note 1, at 133.
84. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58; see also Criticism of Senate Export Bill, Distrib-
uted by Public Citizen (Feb. 14, 1986) (unpublished document) [hereinafter Public Citizen
Criticism].
85. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 59-60.
86. Hearing, supra note 8, at 203-07.
87. E.g., Drug Standar4 Drug Profits, Boston Globe, Nov. 21, 1985, at 26, col. 1; The
Cost of Exporting Trouble, Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 6, 1984, at A6, col. 1.
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of Public Citizen's Health Research Group, described this double standard
as the most fundamental argument against the bill, and one that he believed
was a compelling reason for retaining the ban, outweighing the industry's
claims that lifting the export ban would lead to the creation of jobs and halt
the loss of technology and capital.8"
Somewhat related to the double standard argument is the charge, by the
legislation's opponents, that lifting the export ban would diminish the regard
in which United States pharmaceuticals are held throughout the world.
During debate on the legislation the FDA was described by one foreign com-
mentator as the "envy" of many other countries; and hence the removal of
the protection afforded foreign consumers by FDA approval a "retrograde"
step.89 Further, there is some evidence that the stringent United States drug
approval process may actually serve as a competitive advantage for the in-
dustry.' Thus, critics charged that lifting the ban could both diminish the
value of and prestige associated with United States' pharmaceutical products
and consequently could impair the United States' competitive status on in-
ternational markets.91
Opponents of the drug export legislation also contested vigorously the in-
dustry's estimate of the number of jobs that would be created by lifting the
ban, claiming that a maximum of 8,000 to 9,000 jobs would result from this
change in export policy.92 Moreover, critics noted that there are many fac-
tors other than the ban that influence companies to manufacture or locate
abroad, such as labor costs, international exchange rates, domestic produc-
tion requirements, tariffs and the uncertainty of FDA approval, 93 and that
these factors would not be affected by the abolition of the ban on exports.
Further, it appeared likely that any jobs created or retained in the United
States by a change in export policy would be concentrated in Puerto Rico
because of certain tax advantages and the absence of a union presence in that
territory.94
With respect to the biotechnology industry, opponents of the legislation
88. Hearing, supra note 8, at 196.
89. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at S5664 (letter from University College of London's
Department of Medicine).
90. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. PHARMA-
CEUTICAL INDUSTRY 16 (1984).
91. In 1984 the Department of Commerce attributed the U.S. drug and pharmaceutical
industry's ability "to maintain its positive balance of trade" to its reputation abroad for prod-
uct safety and efficacy. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1984 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK: PROS-
PECTS FOR OVER 300 INDUSTRIES 14-1 (1984).
92. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 59; Senate Debate, supra note 13, at S5665.
93. Hearing, supra note 8, at 216.
94. Id. at 216-17, 335.
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noted that foreign partnerships, and thus technology transfer, would con-
tinue irrespective of the absence of export restrictions, because small biotech-
nology companies' partnerships with foreign firms are often highly beneficial
and in some cases essential.95 Moreover, a great deal of the technology
transfer about which the industry was concerned, occurs by means of scien-
tific journals, research institutions, and conferences that are not affected
whatsoever by the export ban.96
In addition, critics of the bill dismissed arguments that the export ban was
paternalistic and suggested that the FDA's approval procedures were supe-
rior to those in other countries. 97 There are a number of examples of drugs
that were approved in other countries, but not in the United States, that had
to be withdrawn from the market because they were later found to have
severe adverse effects. 98 The most publicized among this list is thalidomide,
a drug never approved for use by the FDA but approved in a number of
European countries, which caused thousands of children to be born de-
formed or brain damaged.99 These examples suggest that FDA's more strin-
gent standards, even as compared with many other developed countries that
have sophisticated systems for drug approval, are superior and do offer for-
eign consumers a higher assurance of protection from ineffective or danger-
ous drugs.'o
Balancing Both Sides of the Debate
Both sides in the debate over drug export restrictions represent legitimate
points of view. Thus, it is impossible to determine categorically that the bill
is inherently unethical or immoral because the health-benefit risks of partic-
ular medicines can be judged differently, and still ethically, for and by other
countries. It is at least arguably overly paternalistic of the United States to
refuse to recognize that other developed and some developing countries are
in the best position to assess this risk for themselves. Moreover, the FDA,
which is a recognized authority on this subject, albeit not one entirely unbi-
ased by political considerations, has had some experience dealing with the
95. Henderson, Biotech Firms Reach Overseas for Partners, Wash. Post, May 19, 1985, at
HI, col. 1.
96. Hearing, supra note 8, at 220.
97. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at S5671-72 (in a letter addressed to Senator Edward
Kennedy, fifty-two members of the European Parliament indicated that the drug approval
standards in Europe were not as high as those of the U.S.).
98. Hearing, supra note 8, at 203.
99. Id.
100. When asked during Senate hearings how he would rate the drug approval process in
the U.S., FDA Comm'r Frank Young indicated that it is "excellent" and that he "would not
trade it for any other system." Id. at 58.
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problems that international recalls of unapproved products entail. The FDA
believes that its methods are adequate to assure that foreign governments
will be notified promptly if significant safety issues arise following the export
of a drug. 0 1
The legislation does, however, create a double standard for pharmaceuti-
cal products. Indeed, the United States may find itself the butt of interna-
tional criticism if an exported unapproved new drug, unavailable to
American consumers, causes illness or deaths abroad.
THE DEBATE OVER TRANSSHIPMENT CONTROLS
No issue was more controversial during the course of debate on the drug
export legislation than that of transshipment. 0 2 Most opponents of the bill
agreed that developed countries, such as Great Britain or West Germany,
were in a position to adequately regulat.- the pharmaceuticals that were re-
ceived from the United States. 03 The concern was, however, that the coun-
tries approved for export would become mere way stations for unapproved
drugs, and that such drugs would be re-exported to Third World countries
which had either an inadequate regulatory system or no system at all with
which to protect the health of their people.'°4
The Case Against Transshipment
The fear that unapproved American drugs would end up in Third World
countries was not simply conjecture. In 1976 and 1982, Drs. Milton
Silverman, Philip R. Lee and Mia Lydecker published books documenting
the unethical practices of pharmaceutical companies in Third World coun-
tries.' 0 5 Among the abuses these authors discovered were that many prod-
ucts withdrawn from the markets or never approved for marketing in
industrialized countries were readily available in Third World countries. "o
In these studies, multinational companies located in the United States were
cited for a large share of the blame for these practices.1
0 7
This phenomenon, known as dumping, is not as pervasive today as it was
101. FDA letter, supra note 44.
102. Senator Howard Metzenbaum, one of the legislation's sharpest critics, stated during
the debate on drug export that if it were not for the issue of transshipment there would be "no
problem" with this bill. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at S5662.
103. Id.
104. Hearing, supra note 8, at 207-08.
105. M. SILVERMAN, P. LEE & M. LYDECKER, PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEATH (1982); M.
SILVERMAN, THE DRUGGING OF THE AMERICAS (1976).
106. See generally PRESCRIPTION FOR DEATH, supra note 104.
107. Id.
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in the 1970's.1° 8 It is, however, a problem that continues to generate inter-
national concern, particularly among Third World countries. This concern
was amply demonstrated by the number of letters that members of Congress
received from individuals and organizations throughout the world opposing
any relaxation in the export ban."°9 Many of the writers from Third World
countries expressed fears that there was no practical way to control re-ex-
port once the FDA ban was lifted, and thus abolition of the ban would ag-
gravate the drug dumping problem in their countries.'°
Third World countries were not the only ones with reservations about the
legislation however. Fifty-two members of the European Parliament also
expressed concern. ' These members concluded that because the European
Economic Community had no laws prohibiting the re-export of unapproved
new drugs, it simply was not possible to prevent them from reaching Third
World countries." 1
2
Excerpts of a debate in the Australian Parliament indicate a different, but
related concern with re-export. The Australians' concern with the drug ex-
port legislation stemmed, at least in part, from their experience with unap-
proved medical devices imported from the United States and their fear that
unapproved drugs, like devices, had a lower order of reliability." 3
Specifically, there have been a number of cases in which exported unap-
proved devices, such as heart valves and pacemakers, were found to be defec-
tive. In each instance, the FDA reported that it was notified by the device
manufacturer on a timely basis of safety problems, and promptly alerted the
health authorities in the countries to which the devices had been exported,
presumably limiting or preventing any resulting health problems." 4 The
FDA acknowledges, however, that drugs and devices "pose different poten-
tial problems" but believes, nevertheless, that it has in place "appropriate
methods to ensure notification if significant safety issues [arose] with regard
to the export of unapproved new drugs."" 5 It is questionable whether the
FDA's system for notification would function adequately, or in fact at all,
108. Letter from P. Lee & M. Silverman to Sen. Kennedy (Oct. 8, 1985) (commenting on
the proposed drug export legislation).
109. See Senate Debate, supra note 13, at S5664-72 (excerpts from a number of letters to
Sen. Kennedy expressing concern about the export bill are reprinted).
110. Id. at S5664.
Ill. Id. at S5671.
112. Id.
113. Id. at S5664. Current law allows unapproved medical devices to be exported to any
nation if the sale of the product is not in conflict with the law of the importing country. 21
U.S.C. § 381(d) (1982).
114. FDA letter, supra note 44.
115. Id.
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despite the agency's best efforts, if a drug were re-exported to an unapproved
country without the FDA's knowledge.
Perspectives on Transshipment
Although most involved with the legislation acknowledged that re-export
was a concern, opinion was divided as to whether the legislation addressed
or even needed to address the problem. Some observers believed that the bill
contained safeguards adequate to contain re-export, while others felt that
once the ban was relaxed, no safeguard, no matter how well intentioned,
would stop it.
The FDA's position was that the safeguards proposed in the Senate bill
were adequate to prevent any re-export. 116 In fact, the FDA contended that
"since drugs unapproved for use in the United States are already reaching
developed and developing nations ... there [was no] obvious public health
purpose to the export restrictions now in place."' 17 Moreover, relaxing the
ban would allow drugs that might have been manufactured elsewhere to be
manufactured in the United States in compliance with rigid FDA standards,
and thus could result in foreign consumers receiving higher quality, albeit
unapproved, new drugs.'18
A former FDA Commissioner contended that lifting the ban could actu-
ally have positive effects outweighing concerns about the efficacy of the pro-
posed safeguards.'1 9 Specifically, he argued that abolishing the ban could
encourage international development agencies to use drugs, such as contra-
ceptives, that might not be approved for use in the United States because
equally reliable methods of a somewhat lower order of risk were available,
but which could be of great benefit to women in Third World countries. 20
For those who considered that lifting the ban on drug exports entailed
substantial risks, opinion was divided on whether the safeguards in the legis-
lation would control the problem. When the Senate considered its drug ex-
port legislation, strong representations were made that its bill contained
safeguards sufficient to prevent unapproved American drugs from being
dumped in Third World countries.12' Specifically, the Senate bill' 22 included
116. Hearing, supra note 8, at 24.
117. FDA letter, supra note 44.
118. Id.
119. Letter from former FDA Comm'r. Donald Kennedy to Rep. Tim Wirth (Nov. 11,
1985) (commenting on drug export legislation).
120. Id.
121. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at S5658.
122. The Senate legislative provisions on transshipment formed the basis, with some excep-
tions, for those embodied in the Drug Export Act. Compare S. 1848, supra note 12 at § 3 with
Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 102, 100 Stat. 3743-45 (to be codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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safeguards such as: (a) the outside of the shipping package had to be labeled
as follows: "[t]his drug may be sold or offered for sale only in the following
countries," (with a list of authorized countries printed directly on the label),
(b) the exporter had to obtain from each of its importers an agreement, to be
renewed annually, that the importer would not re-export the drug to coun-
tries other than those authorized by the law, (c) importers that violated the
law could be prohibited from receiving further exports, and (d) the United
States General Accounting Office ("GAO") had to monitor compliance with
the law.' 23 Senator Kennedy displayed a great deal of confidence in these
safeguards and pronounced them to be "carefully tailored to safeguard the
use of United States manufactured pharmaceuticals sold overseas."' 124
Not all of the safeguards included in the Senate's bill, however, are em-
bodied in the Drug Export Act. Most notably, there is no provision for the
GAO to monitor compliance with the law.' 2 ' Even if all those safeguards
had remained intact in the Drug Export Act, however, in view of the legisla-
tion's critics they would be "meaningless in the absence of active policing by
the FDA."' 26 Active policing was believed to be particularly important be-
cause of a requirement-which was retained in the final Act-that before
taking any action to halt the export of an unapproved new drug the Secre-
tary had to receive "credible" evidence that an importer was re-exporting
drugs to an authorized country. 2 Because the Secretary was granted no
power or responsibility to determine if the law was being broken, i.e., receive
credible evidence, the bill's critics claimed that the safeguards were effec-
tively unenforceable.' 2 '
In addition to the lack of investigatory or enforcement authority, critics
charged that the standard for empowering the Secretary to immediately pro-
hibit further shipments to an importer who had shipped drugs to an unau-
thorized country, was inordinately difficult to apply.' 29 Specifically, the
Secretary had to determine that an unapproved drug posed an "imminent
hazard" in the country to which it was being exported in order to circum-
vent the legislation's due process requirements. 13 The term imminent haz-
123. Id.
124. Senate Debate, supra note 13, at S5661.
125. See 132 CONG. REC. H 11,592 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986, pt. II) (Rep. Madigan com-
menting on the absence of GAO study in final bill).
126. Public Citizen Criticism, supra note 84.
127. Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 102, 100 Stat. 3749 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. 381).
128. Public Citizen Criticism, supra note 83.
129. Id.
130. Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 102, 100 Stat. 3750 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. 381). The
imminent hazard authority is predicated upon similar language in the Drug Amendments of
1962, found in section 505(e) of the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1982). According to the
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ard is not, however, defined in the Act or the FDCA and according to the
bill's critics, has been used only once in the last twenty years to haul a drug
off the market."' Moreover, in the only pertinent legislative history for the
Drug Export Act, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee
stressed that in order for the Secretary to invoke this authority, there must
be "a substantial certainty that death or serious bodily injury will result from
the ... failure to act.' 32 Thus, although the Secretary has the technical
authority to prohibit immediately further shipments of an unapproved drug,
he is virtually precluded from using this authority until deaths or serious
injuries result from the drug's use.
Are the Transshipment Safeguards Adequate?
Indisputably, the safeguards embodied in the Drug Export Act intended
to address the transshipment problem are not fail-safe. And in comparison
to the controls against transshipment that the Department of Commerce ex-
ercises over the commodities that it regulates, the Secretary's authority is
much less far-reaching.133 It may be the case, however, that no controls
would be sufficient to prevent transshipment, and thus the provisions in the
Drug Export Act are adequate to the task. But in any case, because the
provisions for monitoring compliance with the law were not incorporated
into the Drug Export Act, the FDA and the Congress' ability to determine
whether the safeguards are adequate is impaired substantially. Thus, it may
be impossible for anyone to judge reliably whether the safeguards are in fact
effective or simply a reassuring window dressing.
CONCLUSION
In many respects, the Drug Export Act represents a reasonable balance
between the legitimate needs of American industry and Third World con-
cerns over the dumping of unsafe drugs. To its credit, the Act will en-
courage the burgeoning biotechnology industry to retain and expand its
production facilities in this country and enable it to compete more effectively
with foreign competitors.' 34 The new law is not, however, free from risk.
report accompanying the Senate bill, however, under this imminent hazard standard the Secre-
tary's authority is limited to "exceptional case[s]" which do not permit correction by other
means. Compare SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 with Environmental Defense Fund Inc.
v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (the situation needed to invoke the Secretary's
authority under an imminent hazard standard need not rise to the level of a crisis).
131. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 65.
132. Id. at 38.
133. 15 C.F.R. § 347.1(a)-(b) (1986).
134. In an interview on the effect of the new drug export law Thomas D. Kiley, Genentech
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American companies could find themselves in the unenviable position of be-
coming the focal point of international criticism, or worse, if unapproved
pharmaceuticals manufactured in the United States are the cause of deaths
or injuries in developed or developing countries. And if the drug dumping
problem is reignited by this relaxation, the industry will undoubtedly be fur-
ther reviled by international consumer organizations and perhaps even the
Congress.
The most unfortunate (and even cowardly) aspect of the Drug Export Act
is, however, the omission of a mechanism to determine whether its safe-
guards are effective or merely a placebo. A future Congress, of course, could
remedy this problem with legislation mandating that the GAO, or some
other intra-or extra-governmental agency track or monitor compliance with
the Act's re-export prohibitions. Then the Congress and the public would
know for certain that the industry has, as it has represented, "absolutely no
intention of engaging in . . .abhorrent, unethical behavior" and "merely
wish[es] to pursue valuable and viable markets that have requested [U.S.]
product[s]."' 135 Absent this sort of a monitoring mechanism, there will con-
tinue to be doubts about the industry's good faith and ability to comply with
the spirit and the letter of the new law as well as the law's real impact on the
health of foreign consumers.
Mindy Hatton
Vice President of Corporate Development confirmed that the biotechnology industry now has
"less need to transfer technology." Prokesch, supra note 76.
135. Hearing, supra note 8, at 123 (statement of Robert A. Swanson, Chief Exec. Officer,
Genentech, Inc.).
